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Abstract. Cover-free families are set systems used as solutions for a large
variety of problems, and in particular, problems where we deal with n elements
and want to identify d invalid ones among them by performing only t tests
(t ≤ n). We are specially interested in cryptographic problems, and we note
that some of these problems need cover-free families with an increasing size
n. Solutions that propose the increase of n, such as monotone families and
nested families, have been recently considered in the literature. In this paper,
we propose a generalization that we call embedding families, which allows us to
increase both n and d. We propose constructions of embedding families using
polynomials over finite fields, and show specific cases where this construction
allows us to prioritize increase of d or n with good compression ratios. We also
provide new constructions for monotone families with improved compression
ratio. Finally, we show how to use embedded sequences of orthogonal arrays
and packing arrays to build embedding families.
1. Introduction
A cover-free family (CFF) is a set system usually studied in the context of group
testing applications. In this scenario, we are given a set of n elements and want
to identify up to d invalid ones in a more efficient way than testing each one of
them individually. A d-cover-free family (or d-CFF) will indicate how to group the
n elements into t groups (t ≤ n), and by performing only t tests we will be able to
identify up to d invalid elements. These families are used to solve several problems
in cryptography, such as one-time and multiple-times digital signature schemes [22,
15], fault-tolerant aggregation of signatures [8, 9, 21], modification localization on
signed documents and redactable signatures [10], broadcast authentication [16],
broadcast encryption [7], among others [13].
We can represent d-CFFs as set systems or their corresponding incidence matri-
ces. A set system F = (X,B) consists of a set X = {x1, . . . , xt} with |X| = t, and
a collection B = {B1, . . . , Bn} with Bi ⊆ X, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and |B| = n. A d-cover-free
family, denoted d−CFF(t, n), is a set system such that for any subset Bi0 ∈ B and
any other d subsets Bi1 , . . . , Bid ∈ B, we have
(1) Bi0 *
d⋃
j=1
Bij .
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2 EMBEDDING COVER-FREE FAMILIES AND CRYPTOGRAPHICAL APPLICATIONS
Family F can be represented by its t× n binary incidence matrix M:
Mi,j =
{
1, if xi ∈ Bj ,
0 otherwise.
In the remaining of this paper, we may use the term d-CFFs to refer to their
incidence matrices. For a basic reference in combinatorial group testing see [4],
and for more information about combinatorial designs see [3]. Table 1 shows how a
2−CFF(9, 12) can be used to test n = 12 elements and identify up to d = 2 invalid
ones using t = 9 tests.
Table 1. Example of a 2-CFF(9, 12) used in group testing.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 result
test1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
test2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
test3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
test4 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
test5 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
test6 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
test7 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
test8 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
test9 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
The columns of the matrix represent the elements to be tested, and the rows
indicate which elements we are testing together. After performing the 9 testes we
obtain the last column with some results. If all the elements in a test are valid,
the test passes (represented as 0), but if there is at least one defective element in
a test, it fails (represented as 1). By the tests that pass we can identify all the
valid elements, which in the example are 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. Since the
remaining set of elements S = {3, 12} have |S| ≤ d, by the definition of d-CFF we
can conclude 3 and 12 are the defectives (since each of them are the only possible
cause for failure in tests test3, test5, test7, test8, test9).
CFFs provide a practical solution for problems where the number of elements
n is known a priori. For applications where n is not known or can dynamically
increase over time, we need a scheme that provides matrix growth. This can be
done with a special sequence of d-CFFs, where the previous matrix is a sub-matrix
of the next ones, so that we can reuse the groups and computations we already
performed for smaller values of n. Monotone families [8] and nested families [9] of
d-CFFs are examples of such special sequences that are used to acchieve unbounded
fault-tolerant aggregate digital signatures. One drawback of these families is that
d must be constant, so we need more general sequences of families if we wish d to
grow with n. For this purpose, in this paper, we define a generalization of both
monotone and nested families called embedding families.
To compare the efficiency of different families of CFF, we consider the compres-
sion ratio, which is given by ρ(n) when nt(n) is O(ρ(n)). The compression ratio mea-
sures the efficiency gained from group testing, which performs t(n) tests rather than
n. We look for constructions with ρ(n) as large as possible, for example, the ones
that meet or are close to the information theoretical bound ρ(n) = n(d2/ log d) logn [6].
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In the literature, monotone families with constant compression ratio have been given
in [8], while several constructions of (the more general) nested families with com-
pression ratio closer to the information theoretical bound were presented in [9].
Considering the limitation of constant d for monotone and nested families, the
present paper gives constructions of embedding families with good compression
ratios that allows d to grow with n.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows. We revisit a construction of
d-CFF by Erdo¨s et al. [5] based on polynomials over finite fields (Theorem 3.1)
and highlight some useful properties related to progressive d (Theorem 3.2). This
property can be observed in the example in Table 2, where a matrix has submatrices
with smaller d inside it, which allows us to early abort the testing after enough
tests are done for the actual level of defectives. We then give a general construction
of embedding families of CFF, each CFF based on this polynomial construction,
and stacked together using extension fields (Theorem 3.4). Specific applications
of this general construction give embedding families with sublinear d = d(n) and
ρ(n) = n1−
2
k+1 (Corollary 1) as well as with constant d and ρ(n) = nlogn , achieving
the information theoretical upper bound (Corollary 2). Moreover, we show it is
possible to adapt this construction to build monotone families with compression
ratio ρ(n) = n1−
1
k+1 , for each arbitrary constant k ≥ 1 (Theorem 3.5), which is
much superior to the constant compression ratios obtained in [8]. Finally, we show
that families of orthogonal arrays and packing arrays with some specific properties
generalize the polynomial construction of embedding families (Proposition 4), which
can open the door for new constructions in the future.
In Section 2, we define embedding families and discuss cryptographical appli-
cations. In Section 3, we give constructions of embedding families based on poly-
nomials over finite fields. In Section 4, we discuss the use of these constructions
in applications, and challenges related to drop of actual compression ratios when
columns are not used. In Section 5, we generalize the polynomial construction by
using other combinatorial designs, and in Section 6, we give conclusions.
2. Embedding Sequences and its Applications
In this section, we present CFF constructions for unbounded applications, which
are applications where n may not be known a priori or can grow over time. We
introduce the notion of embedding families to be a sequence of CFFs that allows for
the increase of n and d, and we also show how they are a generalization of nested
families [9] and monotone families [8].
Definition 2.1 (Embedding family). Let d(l) be a positive integer and let (M(l))l
be a sequence of incidence matrices of cover-free families (Fl)l = (Xl,Bl)l, where
M(l) is a d(l)-CFF with number of rows and columns denoted by rows(l) and
cols(l), respectively. (M(l))l is a embedding family of incidence matrices of CFFs,
if Xl ⊆ Xl+1, rows(l) ≤ rows(l + 1), and cols(l) ≤ cols(l + 1), d(l) ≤ d(l + 1) and
M(l+1) =
(M(l) Y
Z W
)
.
We can see that monotone and nested families are a special case of embedding
families. They allow us to increase n for fixed d, with a Z that has a special format.
The definitions are shown below.
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Definition 2.2 (Nested family). A nested family of incidence matrices of d-CFFs
is an embedding family of incidence matrices with fixed d such that each row of Z
is one of the rows of M(l), a row of all zeros, or a row of all ones.
Nested families were defined in [9] to solve a problem in unbounded aggregation of
digital signatures, where three different constructions with increasing compression
ratio are presented.
Definition 2.3 (Monotone family). A monotone family of incidence matrices of
d-CFFs is an embedding family of incidence matrices with fixed d such that Z is a
matrix of zeros.
Monotone families were introduced by Hartung et al. [8] to solve the problem
of unbounded aggregation of signatures. They showed a concrete instantiation of
monotone families with a constant compression ratio. We show in Theorem 3.5 a
construction for monotone families with ρ(n) = n1−
1
c , for a constant c.
2.1. Cryptographical Applications. We can think of a variety of applications
for embedding families. General group testing applications, for example, may take
advantage of this family for cases where increasing n is necessary, together with
the possibility of larger d’s. Here we are most interested in applications related to
cryptography.
Aggregation of signatures: The purpose of aggregation of signatures is to save
on storage, communication and verification time by combining several signatures
together [1], and d-CFFs are known to provide this while allowing the identifica-
tion of up to d invalid signatures [8, 9, 21]. Since the number of signatures may
not be known a priori, it is important to have a d-CFF that allows the increase of
n. However, after signatures are aggregated together using a smaller matrix, the
individual signatures are discarded and we only keep the aggregated ones, which
implies that larger matrices should not require the knowledge of those signatures
that were discarded. A solution for this was first proposed by Hartung et al. [8]
using monotone families, where the zero matrix bellow M(l) address this problem
directly. Nested families can also be used as a solution to this problem, since its
submatrix Z also address this problem by requiring only one extra aggregation of
past signatures [9]. The advantage of nested families is that the known construc-
tions present a much better compression ratio, which is closer to the information
theoretical bound, and consequently gives smaller aggregate signature size [9].
Broadcast encryption: In this scheme, a sender broadcasts encrypted messages
to a set of n users, but want to prevent some of them from recovering these messages.
An example of such application is paid television, where only some users can have
access to certain paid channels [7]. Gafni et al. [7] propose the use of d-CFF for
distributing the keys that are used to encrypt and decrypt the message. In this
scenario, the columns of the d-CFF represent the users, and the rows represent a
set of t keys. Each user receives a subset of the keys according to their column,
and the d-CFF property guarantees that we can remove up to d users and their
respective keys without compromising the ability of the remaining users to decrypt
the content. In this scheme, an embedding family would provide a fully scalable
scheme [7], where we can add new users by increasing n, and additionally handle a
larger number d of users that may be removed.
Broadcast authentication: In this scheme, sender and receivers agree on secret
keys, and these keys are used to guarantee the authenticity of broadcasted messages.
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However, there may be malicious users who can get together and use their secret
keys and previous communication to create fraudulent messages, which may be
accepted by some users as authentic [13, 16]. Safavi-Naini and Wang [16] propose
the use of d-CFFs to manage the distribution of keys. Again, the columns of the
CFF represent the users, the rows represent the keys, and each user receives a
subset of these keys corresponding to their column of the matrix. Because of the
d-CFF, the union of the keys of up to d malicious users is not enough to create a
fraudulent message [13, 16]. In this scenario, we could again think of embedding
families as a way to provide an increase in the number of receivers n and malicious
users d that the system can handle.
3. Embedding Sequences Using Polynomials Over Finite Fields
In this section, we present a construction for embedding sequences based on a
known construction of d-CFFs. We start by presenting a construction proposed
by Erdo¨s, Frankl and Fu¨redi [5], that uses polynomials of degree up to k over a
finite field Fq, denoted as f ∈ Fq[x]≤k, and generates a d-CFF(t = q2, n = qk+1)
for d ≤ q−1k . We also note that this known construction presents some interesting
properties that allow us to ignore a few rows of the d-CFF if we need smaller values
of d (see Theorem 3.2). We finally show how to use this polynomial construction
to obtain embedding families, and how we can focus on prioritizing increases of d,
n, and obtain monotone families with increasing compression ratio from it.
Construction 1 (Erdo¨s et al. [5]). Let q be a prime power, k a positive integer,
and consider the elements of the finite field as Fq = {x1, . . . , xq}. We define (X,B)
as follows, for each polynomial f ∈ Fq[x]≤k.
X = Fq × Fq = {(xi, xj) : i, j = 1, . . . , q},
Bf = {(x1, f(x1)), . . . , (xq, f(xq))} ⊂ X,
B = {Bf : f ∈ Fq[x]≤k}.
Call Cq,k the incidence matrix obtained.
The argument in the following proof was observed in [8, 15].
Theorem 3.1. [Erdo¨s, Frankl, Fu¨redi (1985)] Let q be a prime power, k ≥ 1, and
d ≤ q−1k . Then Cq,k from Construction 1 is a d-CFF(q2, qk+1).
Proof. It is easy to see that |X| = q2, |Bf | = q, and |B| = qk+1. Moreover, for fi 6=
fj we have |Bfi∩Bfj | ≤ k. So when we consider any d+1 subsets Bf0 , Bf1 , . . . , Bfd ,
we have that ∣∣∣∣Bf0∖ d⋃
i=1
Bfi
∣∣∣∣ ≥ q − dk ≥ 1,
the last inequality due to hypothesis dk ≤ q−1. Thus, Bf0 6⊆
⋃d
i=1Bfi . Therefore,
(X,B) represents a d-CFF(q2, qk+1) with d ≤ q−1k . 
As an example, for q = 3, d = 2, k = 1, we have X = F3 × F3 = Z3 × Z3,
polynomials with coefficients in F3 of degree up to k = 1, and obtain the 2-CFF(9, 9)
in Table 2.
We note that the d-CFF construction presented above has a special structure
that can be explored to guarantee some interesting properties. Here we focus on
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Table 2. Example of a 1-CFF(6, 9) and a 2-CFF(9, 9).
0 1 2 x x+ 1 x+ 2 2x 2x+1 2x+2
(0, 0) 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
(0, 1) 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
(0, 2) 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
(1, 0) 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
(1, 1) 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
(1, 2) 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
(2, 0) 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
(2, 1) 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
(2, 2) 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
the property of being able to discard some rows of the d-CFF incidence matrix
when smaller values of d are enough, and the ability to increase d as necessary (up
to a maximum) by considering extra rows. This property is important because it
allows the testing algorithm to do an early abort doing only enough tests to detect
the actual defectives d′ if d′ < d, where d is the maximum b q−1k c allowed by the
d-CFF matrix. In the example above, for instance, if we discard the last three rows
we obtain a 1-CFF(6, 9).
For the remaining of this paper we consider a block of rows in this construction
as the set of q rows {(xi, x0), (xi, x1), . . . , (xi, xq)} for every xi ∈ Fq. When we
restrict our matrix to i blocks of rows, we are considering X = {x1, . . . , xi} × Fq,
Bf (i) = {(x1, f(x1)), . . . , (xi, f(xi))} and B(i) = {Bf (i) : f ∈ Fq[x]≤k}.
Construction 2. Let q be a prime power, k ≥ 1, and q ≥ dk + 1. Let Cq,k,d be
the matrix corresponding to B(dk + 1), or in other words, the matrix Cq,k from
Construction 1 restricted to the first (dk + 1) blocks of rows.
Theorem 3.2. Let q a prime power, k ≥ 1, and q ≥ dk + 1. Then Cq,k,d from
Construction 2 is a d-CFF((dk + 1)q, qk+1).
Proof. The proof follows a similar argument as for Theorem 3.1. We have |Bfi(a)∩
Bfj (a)| ≤ k for all fi, fj ∈ Fq[x]≤k and 1 ≤ a ≤ q. Taking any d + 1 distinct sets
Bf0(dk+1), Bf1(dk+1), . . . , Bfd(dk+1), we have |Bf0(dk+1)\
⋃d
i=1Bfi(dk+1)| ≥
dk + 1 − dk ≥ 1. So B(dk + 1) has the d-cover-free property and Cq,k,d is a d-
CFF((dk + 1)q, qk+1). 
For the case of k = 1, we observe that this incremental d property was given
in [14]. This is because the constructions presented in [14] are based on Mutually
Orthogonal Latin Squares (MOLS), which can be constructed with polynomials of
degree k = 1.
3.1. Embedding Sequence Construction. In this section, we give constructions
of embedding sequences of CFFs using the previous construction and extension
fields. We start with a prime power q and consider the increase as q2
i
for i ≥ 0,
which gives a direct increase of n and t. Since we are increasing q, we may also
consider to increase k and/or d as long as we respect the inequality q ≥ dk + 1.
By increasing k to some k′ we make n grow faster and consequently improve the
compression ratio. By increasing d to d′ we can allow the identification of more
defective elements, which may be necessary as the number of elements n grows.
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The following theorem is the basic step to be used in the embedding sequence
construction.
Theorem 3.3. Let q ≥ dk + 1, k′ ≥ k, d′ ≥ d and q2 ≥ d′k′ + 1. Let Cq,k,d and
Cq2,k′,d′ be the CFF matrices obtained from the polynomial construction (Construc-
tion 2). Then, there exists Cq2,k′,d′ obtained from Cq2,k′,d′ by a column and row
permutation that has the form
Cq2,k′,d′ =
(
Cq,k,d Y
Z W
)
.
Moreover, Cq2,k′,d′ is a d
′-CFF((d′k′ + 1)q2, q2(k
′+1)) and Cq,k,d is a d-CFF((dk+
1)q, q(k+1)).
Proof. To form Cq2,k′,d′ we first list the rows of Cq2,k′,d′ that are of the form (xi, xj)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ dk+ 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ q and its columns indexed by Bf for all f ∈ Fq[x]≤k,
followed by the remaining rows and columns in some order. Since Fq is a subfield
of Fq2 , Fq[x]≤k ⊆ Fq2 [x]≤k′ , so we can list the columns starting by all f ∈ Fq[x]≤k
followed by f ∈ Fq2 [x]≤k′ \ Fq[x]≤k, and the evaluations of polynomials in Fq and
Fq2 give the same result. Thus, the (dk + 1)q × qk+1 submatrix of Cq2,k′,d′ in the
upper left corner coincides precisely with Cq,k,d. The fact they are d-CFF and
d′-CFF comes from Theorem 3.2. 
As an example, consider q = 9, d = 2 and k = 1, and increase the last two
parameters to d′ = 4, k′ = 2. We are able to increase C3,1,2 from Table 2 and
obtain a 4-CFF(81, 729) C9,2,4, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Example of a 4-CFF(81, 729)
0 1 2 x x + 1 x + 2 2x 2x + 1 2x + 2 α α + 1 . . .
(2α + 2)x2+
(2α + 2)x+
2α + 2
(0, 0) 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
. . .
(0, 1) 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
(0, 2) 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
(1, 0) 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
(1, 1) 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
(1, 2) 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
(2, 0) 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
(2, 1) 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
(2, 2) 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
(F3, F9 \ F3) 0
.
.
. . . .
(2α + 2, 2α + 2) 0 0 0 1 0 . . .
Theorem 3.3 allows the construction of infinite families of CFF with special
properties, namely monotone families, and embedding families with increasing d
and/or k which have specific advantages.
Theorem 3.4. Let q be a prime power, q ≥ d0k0 + 1. Let ki ≤ ki+1, di ≤ di+1,
q2
i ≥ di+1ki+1+1, for all i ≥ 0. Then, the sequence {Cq2i ,ki,di}i≥0 is an embedding
family of CFFs.
Proof. For q ≥ d0k0 + 1 we build a d0-CFF Cq,k0,d0 using the polynomial construc-
tion (Construction 1, Theorem 3.2). Since ki ≤ ki+1, di ≤ di+1, q2i ≥ di+1ki+1 + 1,
for each i ≥ 0, we apply Theorem 3.3 to embed Cq2i ,ki,di in Cq2i+1 ,ki+1,di+1 .

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Table 4. Example of prioritizing d increases with fixed k = 2.
i q k d n t n/t
0 4 2 1 64 12 5.33
1 16 2 7 4096 240 17.06
2 256 2 127 16777216 65280 257.00
3 65536 2 32767 281474976710656 4294901760 65537.00
Table 5. Example of prioritizing d increases with fixed k = 3.
i q k d n t n/t
0 4 3 1 256 16 16
1 16 3 5 65536 256 256
2 256 3 85 4294967296 65536 65536
3 65536 3 21845 655364 4294967296 4294967296
The following corollaries show useful applications of Theorem 3.4.
Corollary 1 (Prioritizing d increase). Let d0 ≥ 1, k ≥ 1, and let q be a prime
power such that q > d0k. Let di = d q
2i
k e − 1, for i ≥ 1. Then {Cq2i ,k,di}i≥0 is an
embedding family of CFFs. Moreover, its compression ratio is ρ(n) = n1−
2
k+1 and
d ∼ n1/k+1k .
Proof. We have that di = d q
2i
k e − 1 < q
2i
k and therefore dik < q
2i , which satisfies
the hypothesis of Theorem 3.4. Finally, for fixed k and assuming the use of all rows
of the matrix, we easily calculate the compression ratio nt =
(q2
i
)k+1
(q2i )2
= n
n2/k+1
=
n1−
2
k+1 , which is increasing when k ≥ 2. 
We show a few examples in Table 4 and Table 5 for q = 4, 16, 256, 65536 and for
fixed values of k. For each q and k we compute d = d qk e−1 and n = qk+1. We note
that as k increases, the maximum value of d decreases but we get constructions
with a better ratio.
Corollary 2 (Prioritizing ratio increase). Let d ≥ 1 and k0 ≥ 1, q a prime power
such that q > dk0. Let ki = d q
2i
d e − 1. Then {Cq2i ,ki,d}i≥0 is an embedding family
of CFFs. Moreover, the compression ratio is ρ(n) = nlogn .
Proof. We have that ki = d q
2i
d e−1 < q
2i
d , and therefore kid < q
2i , which satisfies the
hypothesis of Theorem 3.4. Finally, for fixed d and assuming the use of all rows of
the matrix, we easily obtain the compression ratio nt =
(q2
i
)ki+1
(q2i )2
≤ (q2
i
)
q2
i
d
(q2i )2
≤ nd logn ,
since d log n = q2
i
log q2
i
< (q2
i
)2. Thus, nt is O(
n
logn ).  
We show some examples in Table 6 and Table 7 for q = 4, 16, 256, 65536, fixed
values of d, and increasing k. For each q and d we compute k = d qde−1 and n = qk+1.
We note that the ratio grows very quickly as k increases to its maximum.
Monotone families are desirable for some applications due to their flexibility
since the new tests involve only new items. By selecting specific blocks of rows
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Table 6. Example of prioritizing ratio increase with fixed d = 2.
i q k d n t n/t
0 4 1 2 16 12 1.33
1 16 7 2 4294967296 240 17895697.07
2 256 127 2 256128 65280 2.75× 10303
3 65536 32767 2 6553632768 4294901760 6.04× 10157816
Table 7. Example of prioritizing ratio increase with fixed d = 3.
i q k d n t n/t
0 4 1 3 16 16 1
1 16 5 3 16777216 256 65536
2 256 85 3 25686 65536 1.95× 10202
3 65536 21845 3 6553621846 4294967296 1.54× 10105211
for the embedding family, we are able to achieve monotone families with increasing
compression ratio, which was not known in the literature [8, 9].
Theorem 3.5. Let d ≥ 1 and k ≥ 1, q a prime power such that q ≥ dk + 1. Let
Cq,k,d be a d-CFF obtained from Construction 1 and {Cq2i ,k,d}i≥0 be an embedding
family of d-CFFs for fixed k and d, obtained from recursively applying Theorem 3.3,
where Cq,k,d = Cq,k,d and Cq2i ,k,d be the reordered matrix as shown in Theorem
3.3. Consider Mq2i ,k,d the submatrix of Cq2i ,k,d corresponding to rows indexed by
(xl, xj) where xl ∈ Fq, l = 1, . . . , dk+1;xj ∈ Fq2i , for all i ≥ 0. Then {Mq2i ,k,d}i≥0
is a monotone family of d-CFF(t = (dk + 1)q2
i
, n = q2
i(k+1)). Moreover, the
compression ratio is ρ(n) = n1−
1
k+1 .
Proof. By fixing xl ∈ Fq, l = 1, . . . , dk+ 1 we obtain a matrix with dk+ 1 blocks of
rows and consequently |Bf | = dk+1, and by the same argument as in Theorem 3.2
we know that each matrix Mq2i ,k,d is a d-CFF with d ≤ q−1k . Moreover, if we look
to the columns of Mq2i ,k,d that are represented by polynomials f ∈ Fq2i−1 [x]≤k, we
know f(xl) = xj ∈ Fq2i−1 , and consequently M(xl,xj),f = 0 for all the cases where
xj ∈ Fq2i\Fq2i−1 , f ∈ Fq2i−1 [x]≤k. It is easy to see that this matches the definition
of monotone family of d-CFFs. Finally, if we use the maximum d = b q−1k c we
obtain a sequence of d-CFF(t = q× q2i , n = (q2i)k+1), which has compression ratio
n
t =
(q2
i
)k+1
q×q2i =
n
qn1/k+1
, which is O(n1−
1
k+1 ). 
For an example of Theorem 3.5 with q = 3, d = 2, k = 1, we refer to Table 3 to
obtain the first two matrices in the sequence. Indeed, M3,1,2 is the top left sub-
matrix, and M9,1,2 is the given matrix restricted to the first dk+1 = 3 blocks of rows
(first two groups of rows in Table 3), and the columns corresponding to polynomials
of degree up to k = 1. The ratio of this monotone family is ρ(n) =
√
n/3.
4. Using Embedding Sequences in Applications
The use of embedding families given in Theorem 3.4 requires some caution. While
compression ratios are excellent when each full matrix is used, as seen in Corollary
1, Corollary 2, and Theorem 3.5, bad ratios can be found when we need to add
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much less items than the maximum n for a matrix. Note that when the number of
columns of M(l) is exceeded we need to use M(l+1) and remove unused columns.
For example, with q = 4, d = 1, k = 2 we get a maximum n = 64, t = (dk+1)q = 12
and ratio ρ(n) = 5.33. If we decide to use the extension field to get larger values of
n, the next value will be q = 16 which gives t = (dk + 1)q = 48. This new matrix
can handle up to n = 4096, but for the case were we only need n = 65 we will have
a very small ratio of ρ(n) = 1.35. For this reason it would be desirable to develop
techniques for “smoothing out” the transition in compression ratio when we move
from one matrix to the next in the embedding family.
One strategy to reduce these sharp transitions is to use values much smaller
than the maximum allowed by the construction. In Figure 1 and Table 8 we show
a choice of q = 16, 256, d = log4 n, and necessary increases of k = 1, 2, 3 to achieve
the desired values of n. We note that as we change from one field (q = 16) to the
next one (q = 256) we have a drop on the compression ratio, and this is due to
the increase in the number of rows (dk + 1)q as we increase q. As n grows, the
increasing ratio is restored.
Figure 1. Compression ratio for q = 16, 256; 1 ≤ k ≤ 3, ; d = log4 n.
5. Generalized Construction of Embedding Families
In this section, we present a generalization of the results presented in Section 3.
We start by defining a few objects that will be used, such as Orthogonal Arrays
(OAs), Packing Arrays (PAs), and their relationships with separating hash families
(SHF). Then we discuss how they can be used to construct embedding families.
Definition 5.1. An orthogonal array OA(vt; t, k, v) is an vt×k array with elements
from an alphabet of v symbols, such that in any t columns, every t-tuple of points
is contained in exactly one row.
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Table 8. Compression ratio for q = 16, 256; 1 ≤ k ≤ 3; d = log4 n.
q k d n t ρ(n) = n/t
16 1 3 128 64 2
16 1 4 256 80 3.2
16 2 4 512 144 3.55
16 2 5 1024 176 5.81
16 2 5 2048 176 11.63
16 2 6 4096 208 19.69
256 2 6 8192 3328 2.46
256 2 7 16384 3840 4.26
256 2 7 32768 3840 8.53
256 2 8 65536 4352 15.05
256 2 8 131072 4352 30.11
256 2 9 262144 4864 53.89
256 2 9 524288 4864 107.78
256 2 10 1048576 5376 195.04
256 2 10 2097152 5376 390.09
256 2 11 4194304 5888 712.34
256 2 11 8388608 5888 1424.69
256 2 12 16777216 6400 2621.44
256 3 12 33554432 9472 3542.48
256 3 13 67108864 10240 6553.6
256 3 13 134217728 10240 13107.2
Definition 5.2 (Stevens and Mendelsohn[17]). A packing array, PA(n; t, k, v), is
an n × k array with values from an alphabet with v symbols, such that in any t
columns, every t-tuple of points is contained in at most one row.
We note that for a PA(n; t, k, v) we must have n ≤ vt, and that an OA(vt; t, k, v)
is a packing array with maximum number of rows.
Definition 5.3 (Stinson et al. [20]). An (n,m, {w1, . . . , wt})-separating hash fam-
ily is a set of functions F , such that |Y | = n, |X| = m, f : Y → X for each f ∈ F ,
and for any sets C1, . . . , Ct ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that |Ci| = wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ t and
Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for i 6= j, there exist at least one function f ∈ F such that
{f(y) : y ∈ Ci} ∩ {f(y) : y ∈ Cj} = ∅.
For |F| = N , the (n,m, {w1, . . . , wt})-separating hash family is denoted
SHF(N ;n,m, {w1, . . . , wt}).
Remark 1. A SHF(N ;n,m, {w1, . . . , wt}) can be depicted as an N × n matrix
A with entries from {1, 2, . . . ,m}, where the rows represent the functions f , the
columns represent the elements in Y , and the entry in A(f, y) = f(y). Given
disjoint sets of columns C1, . . . , Ct, there exists at least one row r in A with the
following property:
{A(r, y) : y ∈ Ci} ∩ {A(r, y) : y ∈ Cj} = ∅.
for all i 6= j.
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The next figure shows an example of an SHF(2; 6, 4, {1, 2}), based on a construc-
tion given by Li, Van Rees and Wei [12].
Figure 2. An SHF(2; 6, 4, {1, 2}).
1 2 3 4 4 4
4 4 4 1 2 3
Now we present some relationships between packing arrays and separating hash
families, and how we can use them to construct CFFs and embedding families. In
the following propositions, we consider a PA(n; t, k, v) and the fact that any two
rows have at most t − 1 positions in common. A similar result is presented by
Stinson et al. [18], where they propose the use of orthogonal arrays to construct
perfect hash families, and mention that similar results can be achieved for SHFs.
Proposition 1. If A is a PA(n; t, k, v), and w ≤ k−1t−1 , then AT is a SHF(N =
k;n,m = v, {1, w}).
Proof. Take w+ 1 rows r, r1, r2, . . . , rw of A. We need to find a column j such that
(2) A[rl, j] 6= A[r, j] for all l ∈ {1, . . . , w}.
Let Bi = {A[r, l] = A[ri, l] : l ∈ {1, . . . , k}}, i ∈ {1, . . . , w}, we know |Bi| ≤ t − 1
since A is a PA. We claim there exists a column j ∈ T = {1, . . . , k}\⋃wi=1Bi, which
is the desired column in (2). In fact,
|T | = |{1, . . . , k}\
w⋃
i=1
Bi| ≥ k −
w∑
i=1
|Bi| ≥ k − w(t− 1) ≥ k − (k − 1)
(t− 1) (t− 1) = 1
so column j exists, which becomes row j when using AT , and therefore guarantees
the necessary and sufficient property for a SHF of type {1, w}. 
Now we show we can construct d-CFF incidence matrices from SHFs. Similar
results can be found in [11] from perfect hash families, and a more general result
can be found in [19] for the construction of (w, d)-CFFs from SHFs of type {w, d}.
Construction 3. Let A be a SHF (N ;n,m, {1, w}), we build a mN ×n matrix M
as follows. Index each row of M with tuples (i, x), for x = 1, . . . ,m, i = 1, . . . , N ,
and each column j = 1, . . . , n, then
M(i,x),j =
{
1 if Ai,j = x,
0 otherwise.
Proposition 2. Let A be a SHF(N ;n,m, {1, w}), then M built via Construction
3 gives a d-CFF(mN,n), with d ≤ w.
Proof. If we take w + 1 columns c0, c1, . . . , cw of a SHF A of type {1, w}, we know
there will be a row i such that A[i, c0] 6= A[i, cj ] for j ∈ {1, . . . , w}. In Construction
3 we convert each element x in A into a vector of size m with one “1” in position x
and “0” in the remaining positions. Due to the SHF property, we note that there
is at least one row (i, x) such that M(i,x),c0 = 1 while M(i,x),cj = 0, (1 ≤ j ≤ w),
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for any columns c0, c1, . . . , cw in M, which matches the requirements for a w-
CFF. Moreover, since we expand each row of A into an array of size m, M is
w-CFF(mN,n).

Remark 2. If we use a PA(n; t, k, v) to build a SHF(N = k;n,m = v, {1, w})
with w ≤ k−1t−1 as in Proposition 1 and then apply Construction 3, we obtain a
d-CFF(mN,n) with d ≤ k−1t−1 .
Remark 3. For the special case where we use an OA(qt; t, q, q) constructed using
polynomials over finite fields using Bush’s construction [2], q a prime power, to build
a SHF(q; qt, q, {1, w}) and then apply Construction 3, we have a d-CFF(q2, qt) for
d ≤ q−1t−1 , which is equivalent to Construction 1 using polynomials.
When we construct a d-CFF from a SHF that came from a PA, we observe a
similar property of blocks of rows giving increasing values of d as in Theorem 3.2.
Proposition 3. Let P be a PA(n; t, k, v), A = PT be a SHF(N = k;n,m =
v, {1, w}) with w ≤ k−1t−1 , and ki = i(t − 1) + 1. Consider M the w-CFF(k × v, n)
obtained from Construction 3 using A and let a “block” of rows be any consecutive
m rows indexed by (i, 1), . . . , (i,m). When we restrict M to any ki blocks of rows
we obtain a i-CFF(ki × v, n).
Proof. From Proposition 1 we know that a SHF of type {1, w} can be created
from a PA P of strength t as long as the number of columns of the PA is at least
k ≥ w(t− 1) + 1. We can restrict the packing array P to ki = i(t− 1) + 1 columns,
1 ≤ i ≤ w, without compromising its properties and therefore obtain a SHF Ai of
type {1, i}. By applying Construction 3 with Ai we obtain a i-CFF(ki × v, n). 
The next proposition shows that a special sequence of PAs generalizes the poly-
nomial construction of embedding family given in Theorem 3.4.
Proposition 4. Let (P(l))l be a sequence of PAs, where P(l) is a PA(nl; tl, kl, vl),
nl ≤ nl+1, tl ≤ tl+1, kl ≤ kl+1, vl ≤ vl+1, and
P(l+1) =
(P(l) Y
Z W
)
,
and in addition dl ≤ kl−1tl−1 , dl ≤ dl+1, for all l ≥ 1. Then there exists an embedding
family of dl-CFF(kl × vl, nl).
Proof. Let A(l) be obtained by transposing P(l). By Proposition 1, since dl ≤ kl−1tl−1 ,
A(l) is a SHF(Nl = kl;nl,ml = vl, {1, dl}), and consequently (A(l))l is a sequence
of SHFs with the following form
A(l+1) =
(A(l) ZT
Y T WT
)
.
Then, for each A(l) we apply Construction 3 and we getM(l), a dl-CFF(kl× vl, nl)
by Proposition 2. It is easy to see that the smaller CFF M(l) is in the top corner
of M(l+1), and all the requirements for being an embedding family are satisfied.

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6. Conclusion
This paper introduces the idea of embedding families of CFFs as a general frame-
work to look at how CFF constructions can be leveraged to optimize parameters of
interest to applications. The infinite families obtained in Section 3 have excellent
asymptotic compression ratios, some matching the information theoretical upper
bound, and permit increase of d and n. However, these constructions present abrupt
increases of t and n (when moving to the next q) that need to be “smoothed out”
for improved use in applications, as discussed in Section 4. An important direction
for future work is the study of adequate growth for d and k to yield smoother in-
stances of these families.
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